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KEYNOTE ADDRESS TO THE 2 3 RD

ANNUAL FULBRIGHT SYMPOSIUMTHE MISSING PEACE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
INTRASTATE RELATIONS

DR. MICHAEL VAN WALT VAN PRAAG*

INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, a leader in the field of
international criminal law, spearheaded a collaborative research project
on conflicts and justice worldwide. The team of 41 researchers found that
313 conflicts had taken place between 1945 and 2008, which resulted in
between 92 and 101 million people being killed - twice as many as in the
First and the Second World War put together. Of course, the figure has
gone up since 2008, with the conflicts in Libya, Syria, Mali, and the
ongoing ones in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. And it does not include
people who died as a consequence of conflicts, which would bring the
total number to between 184 and 202 million.
This number is especially significant considering the enormous effort
that has been made to prevent and resolve conflicts, or wars, starting in
1944, including the founding of the United Nations, with all its agencies
and the International Court of Justice and the development of a new body
* Visiting Professor, Institute for Advanced Study at the School of Historical Studies
(Princeton, NJ); Executive President of Kreddha. The author requests that readers not quote or cite
as this is a draft oral presentation excluding citations. The final paper will be available at a later
time.

I

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014

1

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 20 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 5

2

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. XX

of international law. How might our failure to prevent or swiftly resolve
these conflicts be explained?
A closer look reveals that the overwhelming majorities of armed
conflicts in the past decades have been, and continue to be, intrastate as
opposed to conflicts between States. Most of these conflicts relate to the
power to govern a State or a portion of that State, and their underlying
causes often involve the violation of human rights, including issues of
linguistic, cultural or religious rights of certain groups of the population,
the abuse of power by rulers and questions of political representation,
land rights and uneven distribution of resources.
One type of intrastate conflict is fought over who wields power in the
central government of the State, often pitting an oppositional party or
rebel movement against an incumbent determined not to relinquish or
share the instruments of power. Another type involves the government of
a State on one side and a group within that State, be it a people, an
indigenous people, a tribe, a minority or the population of a distinct
region within the State (referred to hereinafter collectively as 'population
group'), on the other. Such conflicts are identity based and parties fight
over the exercise of authority, for example in the political, economic,
cultural or religious spheres. They fight over control over territory,
environmental issues and security matters and, more broadly over
autonomy and -

in some cases -

independence. Both types of conflict

often also concern ownership or exploitation of natural resources and
may involve powerful transnational corporations not just as stakeholders,
but as actual parties to the conflict. It is this second typeof conflict - that
between a government and a population group - that is the focus of my
remarks today, although some of the points I will make may be relevant
to both types of intrastate conflict.
I am not telling you anything new of course, when I say that the current
international legal system is not sufficiently equipped to address these
types of conflicts. We know that, in particular, two important pillars of
that system, which are based on the core concept of the sovereignty of
territorial States, are detrimental to the prevention and resolution of
intrastate conflicts, namely: 1) the exclusive right of States to participate
as actors in the system and 2) the prohibition of interference in the
internal affairs of those States.
Much has been done and achieved that makes these principles less
uncompromising and therefore, opens the way to addressing intrastate
conflicts more effectively. The application of aspects of international
humanitarian law to non-international armed conflicts and the expansion
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of human rights law and the growth of instruments for its application are
examples. So are the growing body of minority rights standards and the
emerging indigenous peoples rights law which are of direct relevance to
the kinds of intrastate conflicts that we are concerned about here. And
most recently, the adoption of the statute of the International Criminal
Court and of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principle, all serve to
expand international law into what was once considered the exclusive
jurisdiction of sovereign States.
But we are not done yet. Effective prevention and resolution of intrastate
conflicts requires operating from a different paradigm as we further
modify and expand international law. A paradigm where not the State
and its sovereignty, but the safety and well being of individuals and
population groups are central, and where States and their governments
are not only viewed but also treated purely as instruments, could serve
this central purpose. Operating from this paradigm demands the
empowerment of individuals and population groups. It also leads to
attention for accountability of non-State actors, including corporate
financial actors and transnational corporations that contribute to the
causes of violent conflicts or to their prolongation. It is my thoughts on
the changes in international law and the nature of access to international
mechanisms, including courts, that flow from this paradigm that I want
to share with you today.
In the political sphere, the shift away from unipolarity seems evident.
But, what will emerge in its place is not clear, and a meaningful
discussion of multipolarity would require agreement on the meaning of
this contested term and its many ramifications. Poles have primarily been
defined by military, economic and strategic power and influence, but an
argument can be made that other criteria, such as cultural - and some
have suggested moral ones - count as well. Similarly, the polarity
discussion has largely focused on States, but as Richard Higgott and
others have argued, poles do not need to be States and might well include
centers of power or influence of a different kind, such as corporate and
financial ones. I will not attempt here to provide an answer or a theory
but will limit myself to suggest that multipolarity of any kind is likely to
entail uncertainty if not instability.
In relation to States, if unipolarity encouraged the sole super power to act
with less regard for international law, it is conceivable that in a
multipolar world more States will be tempted to do so unless other poles
have an interest and capability to prevent or censure such behavior or
international law is strengthened in ways that respond to the new realities
that are emerging. Either way, international law, in my opinion, will not
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lose its importance provided it is able to make itself relevant to the
aspirations that are most critical to the people in the world, i.e., their
safety and wellbeing. In order to make itself relevant in this way,
international law needs to shift from a focus of protecting the State, to
the extent this no longer serves us, to protecting the people from the
unfettered self interest of ruling elites of States, who are often what we
really should talk about when we refer to 'States,' power, decisionmaking, and even interstate relations.
At any rate, I believe that we are entering a period in which the
importance of the role of international law and its preeminence should
not be allowed to decline provided it can retain and, more importantly,
enhance its relevance. At a basic level, one of the most important
functions of international law is to be in the service of the maintenance
of peace among human communities, however we define, structure and
label them. In other words, international law exists for an important part
to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict and to manage and resolve
non-violent conflict. In order to do so effectively, it needs to be equipped
to address the conflicts we experience in the world today.
I have chosen to speak about the international law of intrastate relations
and, in particular about intrastate conflict prevention and resolution
which is my area of specialization, because I would like to take the
opportunity I have been given to address a distinguished international
gathering such as this one to share my thoughts on this topic in the hope
of persuading you of the usefulness of the approach I am proposing, as
well as of provoking some discussion, perhaps generating new ideas and
learning from your expertise. Judging from your backgrounds and the
topics of your presentations today, I expect to learn a great deal.
It occurred to me when reading and thinking about the meaning of a
multipolar world, that it is tempting to think in Machiavellian terms of
grand strategic moves of major competing players on the world's chess
board - to think, therefore, only of the exercise of power and influence
outside of the player's own boundaries and functional spheres. But, the
conflicts we experience today are relatively local, and therefore risk
being overlooked or dismissed in the grander scheme of things.
Moreover, these conflicts do not directly affect most of your lives or my
life, nor those of most political decision-makers, international officials,
top corporate leaders and elites in a large part of the world. Some of us
have of course had deeply personal experiences of such conflicts. Even
so, our society and environment - certainly here - does not encourage a
feeling of connectedness to, let alone co-responsibility for, the
tremendous suffering and misery caused by war.
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For this reason too, I felt it important to focus my remarks today on this
topic. I am hoping that by doing so you will incorporate some of the
issues I am addressing in your deliberations today and in your thoughts
on solutions for today's emerging multipolar world tomorrow.
I.

THE CHANGING FACE OF THE LAW

When it comes to conflicts within States, international law has and
continues to undergo change.
International Humanitarian Law, also called the Law of War or the Law
of International Armed Conflict, has progressively expanded its field of
application. The narrow concept of war was broadened with the 1949
Geneva Convention's common Article 2 and again with the 1977
Additional Protocol I which added wars of national liberation to its
application. And the second Additional Protocol explicitly extends the
application of essential aspects of humanitarian law to internal
disturbances and tensions, going well beyond the provisions of Article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions.
Human rights law is of course one of the most basic ways in which
international law 'involves itself' in the area of relations between the
State and its citizens. It therefore represents a narrow exception to the
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of States. Since the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this exceptional area has been
broadened to include both individual and - to a minimal extent collective rights. It has, moreover opened the way for individuals to be
recognized as subjects of international law to a very limited degree, as
holders of certain rights, and also for equally limited participation in
international fora by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
representing some of their interests.
The international community has been very reluctant since the Second
World War to recognize group identities and rights as well as to allow
access by minorities and peoples to international organizations and
mechanisms. Instead, it has opted for improving individual rights of
persons belonging to minority groups.
The 1992 Declaration on Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities established rudimentary
standards for minority protection, based and building on the rights of
individuals belonging to minorities provided for in Article 27 of the
ICCPR. As the rising number of conflicts in the territory of the former
Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990's revealed the
critical importance of the management of relations between majority and
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minority population groups within States, this area of the law and
diplomacy received increased attention. The Organization on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in particular, worked on improving
the standard setting and actively engaged in the prevention and resolution
of conflicts involving minorities within States where this would endanger
international peace.
The standards relating to national minorities adopted by the OSCE's
Conference on the Human Dimension in 1990 and subsequent sets of
recommendations developed under the auspices of the OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities on language and education rights
of national minorities and on their effective participation in public life,
have all contributed to an understanding of the importance of recognizing
the legitimate needs and interests of distinct population groups within
States. The High Commissioner's mandate and his intensive silent
diplomacy to prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts involving
minorities as well as the involvement of the OSCE in efforts to resolve
the conflicts in Chechnya, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh
and Transnistria, are further evidence of the recognition, at least within
the OSCE area, of the importance of this issue to the maintenance of
peace.
Within the UN framework, attention for the place and rights of minorities
in States also increased and very limited access has been provided by the
creation of the Forum on Minority Issues and by the appointment of the
Independent Expert on Minority Issues.
A similar development has taken place with respect to the law regarding
the rights of indigenous peoples and their relations with the States they
live in. The adoption by the UN General Assembly, after decades of
work in the various human rights bodies of the UN, of the Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 was a milestone in the
recognition of the distinct rights and place in international law of
indigenous peoples. In contrast with the law relating to minorities,
indigenous peoples are recognized as distinct groups that possess rights,
and therefore have a certain collective international legal personality.
The creation of the Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues and the
appointment of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples have both
created avenues for limited access of indigenous peoples' organizations
and representative bodies to the UN system. Although these mechanisms
do in practice serve to draw attention to potential conflicts involving
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indigenous peoples, neither of them is mandated to engage in conflict
prevention or resolution.
A recent development that has pushed the boundaries of international law
into the sphere of domestic jurisdiction is the creation of the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC's statute provides it with
jurisdiction where genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as
well as the crime of aggression are committed. The inclusion of these
crimes under international law, especially the first three that are most
relevant to the topic of this lecture, is of course not new, given the
Genocide Convention and the precedents of the Nuremburg and Tokyo
Tribunals as well as more recently the tribunals on Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. Nevertheless, the creation, by treaty, of a permanent court
with the competence to prosecute and try suspects, including government
officials while in office, for crimes committed within their State is
groundbreaking - despite the reaffirmation of the principle of nonintervention in the preamble. With respect to war crimes, the Rome
Statute makes specific provisions for protracted intrastate armed
conflicts. It is important in this respect that the procedure for seizing the
Court is not State focused only, since the prosecutor can investigate
crimes proprio motu on the basis of information available to her or him,
furnished by non-State parties and others.
The encroachment does not end there. One of the potentially most far
reaching developments has been the unanimous adoption of the
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principle at the 2005 World Summit. Its
re-affirmation in subsequent UN Security Council resolutions and,
following the release of the Secretary General's report on the matter, by
the General Assembly since then has arguably made this a norm that
profoundly affects the seemingly unassailable principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign States. It holds the
promise to prevent at least the more extreme and massive assaults by a
State on the people within its boundaries as well as by non-State actors
where the State is incapable or unwilling to protect its people.
The Responsibility to Protect principle, as reflected in the UN World
Summit Outcome Document and relevant Security Council and General
Assembly resolutions, consists of the following basic principles: (1) that
each State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and therefore
must prevent these crimes, a task which the international community
should 'encourage and help' States to fulfill; and (2) that the
international community has the responsibility to take timely action to
protect populations from those crimes, and where necessary even to
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intervene militarily (under Chapter VII of the Charter) where the
authorities of the State in question are 'manifestly failing to protect'
them.
This formulation is more limited than that proposed by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), on which the
UN debates and decisions were based, but both affirm the principle that
State sovereignty entails responsibility and that prevention is the most
important dimension of this responsibility. The conclusions of the ICISS,
however, that "where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result
of internal war, insurgency, repression or State failure, and the State in
question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of
nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to protect"' was
narrowed by the UN member States to apply only to those mass atrocity
crimes enumerated in the UN RtoP-related resolutions.
This being as it may, and although the UN reaffirmed the principles of
State sovereignty and non-intervention in its resolutions, it has at the
same time asserted the conditionality of these principles on the State's
ability and willingness to protect. And the International Court of Justice,
for its part, has since confirmed that States have a positive legal
obligation to take all measures reasonably available to them to prevent
such crimes, at least in relation to genocide.
Because the RtoP norm rests and builds on existing international law,
some scholars have suggested that in substance it provides little that is
new. A mandate for the international community to intervene, even
militarily, already existed under Chapter VII of the Charter, and they
question whether the RtoP principle even affects the law on humanitarian
intervention. In my view, the explicit articulation of the responsibility of
States to protect their own populations as "a defining attribute of
sovereignty and statehood"2 is very significant, and the RtoP principle
arguably provides the Security Council the mandate to intervene in
internal situations on humanitarian grounds alone, rather than having to
show that a situation endangers international peace before it can act; this
is of considerable consequence. Having said that, of course the RtoP

1. INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION
ON
INTERVENTION
AND
STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY xi (International
Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Dec 2001).
2.
"The protection of populations is a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the
twenty-first century." Ban Ki-moon, iplementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the
Secretary General, T 14, A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
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norm is a new and still emerging norm, and its interpretation and
exercise is still a subject of considerable debate.
Finally, the current negotiations for the conclusion of the Arms Trade
Treaty at the UN headquarters in New York represent yet another step in
restricting the actions of sovereign States in the interest of protecting
people from abuse by their government authorities.
What we may be witnessing is a shift from the "persistence of the core
idea, going all the way back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, that
sovereignty means, above all else, control of a State's territory,
unfettered by external constraints,"' to the concept of the State as an
instrument at the service of its people and its sovereignty as a
responsibility to the people, and specifically a responsibility to protect
them. But, as I said before, we are not there yet.
The founders of the UN were very preoccupied with preventing States
from waging war against each other and took far-reaching steps to
restrict their freedom to this end. But, as Gareth Evans points out,
"notwithstanding all the genocidal horrors inflicted during the Second
World War, they showed no particular interest in the question of what
constraints might be imposed on how States dealt with their own
populations."4 This may be a little harshly stated given the adoption of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at that time, but the point is
otherwise well taken. So, the incredibly tenacious belief in the principle
that "nothing contained in the [UN] Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state"' has prevailed since. Kofi Annan tried to break
through the sovereignty-intervention debate by articulating a
reconceptualization of sovereignty in terms of "individual sovereignty"'
and of the State as an instrument at the service of its people, a notion I
am expanding on here because his articulation conspicuously leaves out
groups, suggesting an assumption that all that is needed is protection of
individuals.
The attention since the adoption of the UN Charter has been on
individual rights and the need to protect the individual due to the political
sensitivity of the issue of group rights. Yet this is something we cannot
3. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES
ONCE AND FOR ALL 21 (Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
4.
Id.
5. UN Charter art. 2(7), 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (Oct. 24, 1945).
6.
Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, THE ECONOMIST 49-50 (Sept. 18, 1999),
available at http://www.economist.com/node/324795.
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afford to continue to skirt, especially in view of the role group identity
plays in intrastate conflicts. And let us not forget that the whole concept
of genocide and ethnic cleansing, which are key crimes which the RtoP
and the ICC were created to address, are based precisely on the
recognition of the importance of protecting the group. Indeed, the very
concept of 'genocide' developed by Raphael Lemkin and which lies at
the base of the law of genocide (codified in the Genocide Convention)
''captured some of the momentous quality of actions that are aimed not
just at destroying individuals but whole national, racial, ethnic, or
religious groups - targeting, as Lemkin put it, the essential foundations of
their life as such groups."'
Having said that, the reference in the UN resolutions to the responsibility
to protect 'populations' of a State, in the plural, and the UN Secretary
General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide's
characterization of genocide as an extreme form of identity-based
conflict, may suggest some acknowledgement of the importance of
population groups in addressing the causes of conflicts and therefore,
also in their prevention and resolution.
Since so many intrastate conflicts, and the atrocities and suffering they
bring, take place between States and peoples or minorities or between
population groups within States and are, at the core, identity based, we
must integrate the protection of population groups into the changes
taking place in international law. Not just where this manifests as mass
atrocity crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing, but all attacks on
population groups - whether cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, racial,
or other - because of who they are. By the same token, the responsibility
of the State to protect individuals should not be limited to mass atrocity
crimes either.
The concepts and principles underlying the RtoP must therefore be
considered universally applicable and not only tied to the somewhat
exceptional situations of 'mass atrocity crimes' that warrant intervention
under the RtoP adopted by the UN.
H.

PREVENTION

There is consensus that prevention is of fundamental importance. What
this necessarily entails is addressing the root causes of conflicts before
they turn violent or even before they manifest at all if possible - not
waiting until the storm of mass atrocities has gathered. What prevention
7.

EVANS, supra note 3, at 20.
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also entails, is addressing the causes of conflict in peace processes in the
content of peace agreements and in the implementation of those
agreements. I wish here once again to draw attention, albeit briefly, to
the importance of granting access for population groups to international
conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms and, more broadly, to
decision-making at the international level. So let me say a couple of
things in this regard.
Mediated intrastate peace efforts are increasingly focusing on autonomy
and power sharing arrangements as a preferred solution to intrastate
conflicts. With respect to the type of intrastate conflicts that I am
focusing on today, autonomy arrangements hold the promise to satisfy
both the State and the population group or groups' needs and to address
the causes of conflicts without the necessity to break up the State. These
arrangements can be tailor fitted and be limited or broad, transitional
solutions or permanent solutions, albeit flexible.
I personally believe that well crafted autonomy arrangements that satisfy
the most important needs of all parties have the potential to be excellent
solutions to many intrastate conflicts. However, current practice shows
that 1) the majority of intrastate peace agreements containing autonomy
arrangements are not, or not well, implemented, and 2) even when they
are, the autonomy arrangement's fragility surfaces when the central or
the autonomous authorities assert power beyond the delicate balance
inherent in such asymmetric structures. Both scenarios lead to renewed
tensions and, sometimes, armed conflict.
Some of the reasons for non-implementation of peace agreements have to
do with post-armed conflict institutional fragility. Of particular relevance
to our topic, however, is the lack of political will to implement by
relevant players on both sides, sometimes occasioned by changes of
government or leadership, but also because of vested interests in the
continuation of the conflict or some part of it. Non-State armed groups
may want to retain the capacity to defend themselves militarily against
challenges to their authority, while governments and their leaders may be
reluctant to devolve power as part of an agreement.
One ingredient in the strategy for intrastate conflict prevention and for
better implementation of intrastate peace agreements is making use of
select UN, other fora and of international courts and tribunals to help
peacefully resolve intrastate disputes.
There is today no ready way for non-State parties and States to bring a
dispute between them before an international court or tribunal (let alone
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disputes between non-State parties). Considering the bad record of
intrastate peace agreement implementation, international and regional
courts could contribute to conflict prevention in a major way if their
jurisdiction extended to intrastate disputes, including those relating to the
interpretation and implementation of peace agreements and autonomy
arrangements.
I headed an initiative by Kreddha a number of years ago to address this
issue. We turned in particular to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA) in the Hague to propose that it accept jurisdiction for disputes
between States and non-State parties regarding the implementation of
peace agreements concluded by them. As a result, today parties to an
intrastate peace agreement can include a clause in their agreement that
enables each of them to refer disputes arising out of the implementation
or non-implementation to the PCA. The first such case was successfully
brought before the PCA by the non-state party to the 2004 North-South
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement with respect to the border
demarcation in the Abyei region. This has created a useful precedent and
is thus a step in the right direction, but one that needs to be
institutionalized and broadened to the International Court of Justice as
well as regional courts. Jurisdiction should, moreover, extend to cases
where corporations are parties to conflicts or potential conflicts, as is
increasingly the case.
This above is but one example. For conflict prevention to succeed parties
to potential conflicts must have avenues for dialogue, possibly
facilitated, and mechanisms for resolving disputes among them. They
should be encouraged to meet, dialogue and co-decide issues of mutual
importance in international fora, as well as to resolve their disputes using
international mechanisms, where national ones do not provide conducive
means to do this. The exclusion of population groups and autonomous
sub-state entities from such effective participation is a shortcoming of the
international legal system.
III. PARADIGM SHIFT
We can suggest more arguments, but what we really need to do is make a
paradigm shift - or perhaps more accurately we need to complete the
paradigm shift that we are in the process of undergoing - to a place
where the State and its sovereignty - with all the rights and privileges and
protections that entails - are no longer central. Instead, the safety and
wellbeing of individuals and population groups are central, and States
and their governments are not only viewed but also treated purely as
instruments to serve this purpose. The corollary of such a transformation

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol20/iss1/5

12

Van Praag: The Missing Peace

2014]

THE MISSING PEACE

13

must be that the safety and wellbeing of individuals and population
groups must not be pursued in any way to the detriment of the safety and
wellbeing of other individuals and groups within or outside the State.
The other consequence of such a shift is that the voices of the individuals
and population groups must be given a meaningful place in decisionmaking at the international level. For if States have the exclusive power
to decide, as they have had, most worthy initiatives that would spring
from attempts to operate from the new paradigm would be stifled or
watered down in efforts to retain the power of States befitting the
traditional conception, and therefore effectively prevent the
operationalization of the new paradigm. By the same logic, in the
international judicial field change must also be acted upon, and careful
access provided to non-State parties in ways that will help prevent and
resolve intrastate conflicts.
I have not tackled the question of the place and role of transnational
corporations in intrastate conflicts and intrastate relations, not for lack of
importance. Indeed their importance is only accentuated by the
realization that some of these non-State actors constitute actual poles, in
other words important centers of power or influence, in the emerging
multipolar world. Their lack of accountability under international law for
their roles in conflicts should be of concern to us all. But, it is a major
topic to which I cannot do justice in this lecture and which I will leave
for another occasion. But, here too, the non-interference principle and the
exclusive rights of States - also with respect to corporations - is an
impediment.
As we have seen, the law has undergone considerable change since the
Charter's adoption. But we also note that as a matter of practice the
international community has intervened where the political will existed
to do so. But, often not before unacceptably large numbers of people had
to suffer and die. Powerful States also intervene on their own or with
allies, regardless of the rules of international law, in order to protect their
own interests if they can get away with it. So the prohibition of
intervention in a State's domestic affairs is not as starkly black and white
in practice as its predominance in law suggests, and this results in
ambiguities. My point here is that we need a clear and coherent body of
international law that has population groups and individuals, as well as
their relationship to the State in which they live at the heart of the
system; Not States, State interests, and State sovereignty alone. The State
structure and international system should facilitate peaceful relations
among all population groups within States and across boundaries, not
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only among those that hold power. Also, democracy - though of critical
importance -

is not sufficient.

Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White also argue for a change
in the international legal system, but do so on the basis of different but
equally important arguments:
[t]he process of globalization and the emergence of new
transnational threats have fundamentally changed the nature of
governance and the necessary purposes of international law in
the past few years. From cross-border pollution to terrorist
training camps, from refugee flows to weapons proliferation,
international problems have domestic roots that an interstate
legal system is often powerless to address. To offer an effective
response to these new challenges, the international legal system
must be able to influence the domestic policies of states and
harness national institutions in pursuit of global objectives.'
In conclusion: we noted how the creators of the UN Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reframed and re-conceptualized
international law with the overriding purpose to end wars among States,
precipitating the development of a whole new body of law leading up to
what we have today. So too, we must take what we have, preserve the
achievements to date, and reframe and re-conceptualize it; this time from
the standpoint of the new paradigm in which individuals and population
groups are central, so as to effectively respond to today's challenges,
including that of intrastate conflicts and the 'scourge of war' which the
founders of the UN did not address.
From this reconceptualization there can emerge the body of law I call
international law of intrastate relations, consisting of all that already
exists in international law that relates to this subject matter (some of
which I have highlighted today) as well as new law, to be created with
the participation of non-State actors. I visualize a whole new field of
international law that will be reflected in law school courses and
textbooks; A field that will advance and expand once the new paradigm
has caught on.
What I am proposing is not that far fetched, considering the
developments I outlined earlier and the considerable shifts that are taking
place as we speak. Holders of State power will resist it and its
8. Slaughter and Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the
European Way of Law), 47 HARV INTL U 327, 328 (2006).
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consequences for some time, but let us not forget that international law is
not only theirs to make: it is the result of the interplay of State treaty
making and State practice, of decisions of international courts and, to a
lesser degree, national courts and of scholarship: opinio juris. We have
our role to play in all these fields.
Surely, we do not need to wait for a new catalyst in the form of yet
greater mass atrocities to address the underlying problems. The death and
suffering caused by intrastate conflicts throughout the world continues to
inflict is sufficient incentive. Thank you for your time and attention.
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